United Nations S/2014/686

Security Council

Distr.: General
19 September 2014
English
Original: Arabic

Letter dated 16 September 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Libya to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

In my capacity as Chair of the Group of Arab States for the month of September 2014, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith resolution 7808 entitled "The occupation by the Islamic Republic of Iran of the three Arab islands in the Arabian Gulf belonging to the United Arab Emirates: the Greater Tunb, the Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa", adopted by the Council of the League of Arab States at the ministerial level at its 142nd ordinary session, which was held in Cairo on 7 September 2014 (see annex).

We draw your attention to paragraph 12 of the resolution in which the Council of the League requests that the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the President of the Security Council should be informed of the importance of maintaining the issue on the list of matters of which the Security Council is seized until Iran ends its occupation of the three Arab islands and the United Arab Emirates regains its full sovereignty over them.

I should be grateful if you would arrange for the present letter and its annex to be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Ibrahim O. A. **Dabbashi**
Permanent Representative
Chair of the Group of Arab States for the month of September 2014

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Annex to the letter dated 16 September 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Libya to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

The occupation by the Islamic Republic of Iran of the three Arab islands in the Arabian Gulf belonging to the United Arab Emirates: the Greater Tunb, the Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa

The Council of the League at the ministerial level,

Having considered:

The note of the Secretariat,

The report on the intersessional activities of the Secretariat,

The recommendation of the Political Affairs Committee,

Guided by previous summit resolutions, the most recent of which was resolution 510 of the Sirte summit (22nd ordinary session) dated 28 March 2010, regarding the occupation by the Islamic Republic of Iran of the three Arab islands in the Arabian Gulf belonging to the United Arab Emirates: the Greater Tunb, the Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa,

Reaffirming its earlier resolutions and communiqués on the same matter, the most recent of which was resolution 7741 (141st ordinary session) of 9 March 2014,

Decides

1. To reaffirm without qualification the absolute sovereignty of the United Arab Emirates over its three islands of the Greater Tunb, the Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa and to support all peaceful measures and means adopted by the United Arab Emirates to regain its sovereignty over the occupied islands;

2. To denounce the continued consolidation by the Iranian Government of its occupation of the three islands and its violation of the sovereignty of the United Arab Emirates, which can only undermine security and stability in the region and pose a threat to international peace and security;

3. To condemn the building by the Iranian Government of housing facilities to settle Iranians on the three occupied islands of the United Arab Emirates;

4. To condemn the Iranian military manoeuvres being conducted also on the three occupied islands of the United Arab Emirates, namely, the Greater Tunb, the Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa, and in those islands' territorial waters, airspace, continental shelf and exclusive economic zone, which constitute an inseparable part of the United Arab Emirates; and to request that Iran desist from such violations and acts of provocation, which constitute interference in the internal affairs of an independent, sovereign State; do not promote confidence-building; threaten security and stability in the region; and endanger the security and safety of regional and international navigation in the Arabian Gulf;

5. To condemn the opening by Iran of two offices on the island of Abu Musa, which belongs to the United Arab Emirates, and to call upon Iran to close down those illegitimate facilities and respect the sovereignty of the United Arab Emirates over its territory;

6. To denounce and condemn the planned fact-finding visit of the members of the National Security and Foreign Policy Committee of the Iranian Consultative

Assembly to the occupied islands belonging to the United Arab Emirates, namely, the Greater Tunb, the Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa, an act that would violate the sovereignty of the United Arab Emirates over its territory and would be inconsistent with attempts to find a peaceful settlement; and to call upon Iran to desist from taking such provocative steps;

7. To commend the United Arab Emirates on its initiative to find a peaceful and just settlement to the issue of the three occupied islands (the Greater Tunb, the Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa) with the Islamic Republic of Iran;

8. To appeal once again to the Iranian Government to end its occupation of the three islands of the United Arab Emirates, refrain from trying to impose a fait accompli by force, desist from establishing any installations there for the purpose of modifying the islands' demographic structure, revoke all measures and remove all installations unilaterally executed by Iran on the three Arab islands, inasmuch as such measures and claims are null and void, lack any legal effect, do not detract from the established right of the United Arab Emirates over its three islands and are acts that run counter to the provisions of international law and the Geneva Conventions of 1949; and to call upon the Iranian Government to adopt peaceful means for resolving the existing dispute over them in accordance with the principles and norms of international law, including agreement to refer the matter to the International Court of Justice;

9. To express the hope that the Islamic Republic of Iran will reconsider its position of rejecting the effort to find a peaceful solution to the issue of the three occupied islands of the United Arab Emirates either through direct, earnest negotiations or through recourse to the International Court of Justice;

10. To call upon Iran to translate its stated desire for improved relations with the Arab countries and for dialogue and détente into concrete steps, both in word and in deed, in the form of a genuine response to the earnest appeals launched by His Highness Sheikh Khalifa Bin Zayed Al Nahyan, President of the United Arab Emirates, and by the States members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Arab States, international groups, friendly nations and the Secretary-General of the United Nations, calling for a solution to the dispute over the three occupied islands by peaceful means in accordance with customary practice and the covenants and rules of international law, either through direct, earnest negotiations or through recourse to the International Court of Justice, with a view to building trust and enhancing security and stability in the Arabian Gulf region;

11. To have all Arab States undertake, in their contacts with Iran, to raise the issue of that country's occupation of the three islands in order to stress the need to end it, based on the fact that the three islands are occupied Arab territory;

12. To inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the President of the Security Council of the importance of maintaining the issue on the list of matters of which the Security Council is seized until Iran ends its occupation of the three Arab islands and the United Arab Emirates regains its full sovereignty over them;

13. To request the Secretary-General of the League to follow up this matter and report to the Council at its next session.

(Resolution No. 7808 — 142nd ordinary session — 3rd meeting — 7 September 2014)

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Security Council

Distr.: General
17 September 2014

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General concerning the credentials of the deputy representative of the Russian Federation on the Security Council

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received a letter dated 16 September 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations stating that Mr. Dmitry Igorevich Maksimychev has been appointed deputy representative of the Russian Federation on the Security Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, this letter constitutes adequate provisional credentials.

14-61346 (E) 220914

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United Nations S/2014/688

Security Council

Distr.: General
24 September 2014

Original: English

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Canada, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Eritrea, Esfonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guinea, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritania, Federated States of Micronesia, Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Vanuatu and Yemen: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Reaffirming that terrorism in all forms and manifestations constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and security and that any acts of terrorism are criminal and unjustifiable regardless of their motivations, whenever and by whomsoever committed, and *remaining* determined to contribute further to enhancing the effectiveness of the overall effort to fight this scourge on a global level,

Noting with concern that the terrorism threat has become more diffuse, with an increase, in various regions of the world, of terrorist acts including those motivated by intolerance or extremism, and *expressing* its determination to combat this threat,

Bearing in mind the need to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, and *affirming* Member States' determination to continue to do all they can to resolve conflict and to deny terrorist groups the ability to put down roots and establish safe havens to address better the growing threat posed by terrorism,

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Emphasizing that terrorism cannot and should not be associated with any religion, nationality or civilization,

Recognizing that international cooperation and any measures taken by Member States to prevent and combat terrorism must comply fully with the Charter of the United Nations,

Reaffirming its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all States in accordance with the Charter,

Reaffirming that Member States must ensure that any measures taken to counter terrorism comply with all their obligations under international law, in particular international human rights law, international refugee law, and international humanitarian law, *underscoring* that respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law are complementary and mutually reinforcing with effective counter-terrorism measures, and are an essential part of a successful counter-terrorism effort and notes the importance of respect for the rule of law so as to effectively prevent and combat terrorism, and *noting* that failure to comply with these and other international obligations, including under the Charter of the United Nations, is one of the factors contributing to increased radicalization and fosters a sense of impunity,

Expressing grave concern over the acute and growing threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters, namely individuals who travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist training, including in connection with armed conflict, and *resolving* to address this threat,

Expressing grave concern about those who attempt to travel to become foreign terrorist fighters,

Concerned that foreign terrorist fighters increase the intensity, duration and intractability of conflicts, and also may pose a serious threat to their States of origin, the States they transit and the States to which they travel, as well as States neighbouring zones of armed conflict in which foreign terrorist fighters are active and that are affected by serious security burdens, and *noting* that the threat of foreign terrorist fighters may affect all regions and Member States, even those far from conflict zones, and *expressing* grave concern that foreign terrorist fighters are using their extremist ideology to promote terrorism,

Expressing concern that international networks have been established by terrorists and terrorist entities among States of origin, transit and destination through which foreign terrorist fighters and the resources to support them have been channelled back and forth,

Expressing particular concern that foreign terrorist fighters are being recruited by and are joining entities such as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the Al-Nusrah Front (ANF) and other cells, affiliates, splinter groups or derivatives of Al-Qaida, as designated by the Committee established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011), *recognizing* that the foreign terrorist fighter threat includes, among others, individuals supporting acts or activities of Al-Qaida and its cells, affiliates, splinter groups, and derivative entities, including by recruiting for

or otherwise supporting acts or activities of such entities, and *stressing* the urgent need to address this particular threat,

Recognizing that addressing the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters requires comprehensively addressing underlying factors, including by preventing radicalization to terrorism, stemming recruitment, inhibiting foreign terrorist fighter travel, disrupting financial support to foreign terrorist fighters, countering violent extremism, which can be conducive to terrorism, countering incitement to terrorist acts motivated by extremism or intolerance, promoting political and religious tolerance, economic development and social cohesion and inclusiveness, ending and resolving armed conflicts, and facilitating reintegration and rehabilitation,

Recognizing also that terrorism will not be defeated by military force, law enforcement measures, and intelligence operations alone, and *underlining* the need to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, as outlined in Pillar I of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (A/RES/60/288),

Expressing concern over the increased use by terrorists and their supporters of communications technology for the purpose of radicalizing to terrorism, recruiting and inciting others to commit terrorist acts, including through the internet, and financing and facilitating the travel and subsequent activities of foreign terrorist fighters, and *underlining* the need for Member States to act cooperatively to prevent terrorists from exploiting technology, communications and resources to incite support for terrorist acts, while respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms and in compliance with other obligations under international law,

Noting with appreciation the activities undertaken in the area of capacity building by United Nations entities, in particular entities of the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF), including the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the United Nations Centre for Counter-Terrorism (UNCCT), and also the efforts of the Counter Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) to facilitate technical assistance, specifically by promoting engagement between providers of capacity-building assistance and recipients, in coordination with other relevant international, regional and subregional organizations, to assist Member States, upon their request, in implementation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy,

Noting recent developments and initiatives at the international, regional and subregional levels to prevent and suppress international terrorism, and *noting* the work of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), in particular its recent adoption of a comprehensive set of good practices to address the foreign terrorist fighter phenomenon, and its publication of several other framework documents and good practices, including in the areas of countering violent extremism, criminal justice, prisons, kidnapping for ransom, providing support to victims of terrorism, and community-oriented policing, to assist interested States with the practical implementation of the United Nations counter-terrorism legal and policy framework and to complement the work of the relevant United Nations counter-terrorism entities in these areas,

Noting with appreciation the efforts of INTERPOL to address the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters, including through global law enforcement information sharing enabled by the use of its secure communications network, databases, and system of advisory notices, procedures to track stolen, forged identity papers and

travel documents, and INTERPOL's counter-terrorism fora and foreign terrorist fighter programme,

Having regard to and highlighting the situation of individuals of more than one nationality who travel to their states of nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist training, and *urging* States to take action, as appropriate, in compliance with their obligations under their domestic law and international law, including international human rights law,

Calling upon States to ensure, in conformity with international law, in particular international human rights law and international refugee law, that refugee status is not abused by the perpetrators, organizers or facilitators of terrorist acts, including by foreign terrorist fighters,

Reaffirming its call upon all States to become party to the international counter-terrorism conventions and protocols as soon as possible, whether or not they are a party to regional conventions on the matter, and to fully implement their obligations under those to which they are a party,

Noting the continued threat to international peace and security posed by terrorism, and *affirming* the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts, including those perpetrated by foreign terrorist fighters,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Condemns* the violent extremism, which can be conducive to terrorism, sectarian violence, and the commission of terrorist acts by foreign terrorist fighters, and *demands* that all foreign terrorist fighters disarm and cease all terrorist acts and participation in armed conflict;

2. *Reaffirms* that all States shall prevent the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups by effective border controls and controls on issuance of identity papers and travel documents, and through measures for preventing counterfeiting, forgery or fraudulent use of identity papers and travel documents, *underscores*, in this regard, the importance of addressing, in accordance with their relevant international obligations, the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters, and *encourages* Member States to employ evidence-based traveller risk assessment and screening procedures including collection and analysis of travel data, without resorting to profiling based on stereotypes founded on grounds of discrimination prohibited by international law;

3. *Urges* Member States, in accordance with domestic and international law, to intensify and accelerate the exchange of operational information regarding actions or movements of terrorists or terrorist networks, including foreign terrorist fighters, especially with their States of residence or nationality, through bilateral or multilateral mechanisms, in particular the United Nations;

4. *Calls upon* all Member States, in accordance with their obligations under international law, to cooperate in efforts to address the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters, including by preventing the radicalization to terrorism and recruitment of foreign terrorist fighters, including children, preventing foreign terrorist fighters from crossing their borders, disrupting and preventing financial

support to foreign terrorist fighters, and developing and implementing prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegration strategies for returning foreign terrorist fighters;

5. *Decides* that Member States shall, consistent with international human rights law, international refugee law, and international humanitarian law, prevent and suppress the recruiting, organizing, transporting or equipping of individuals who travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist training, and the financing of their travel and of their activities;

6. *Recalls* its decision, in resolution 1373 (2001), that all Member States shall ensure that any person who participates in the financing, planning, preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts is brought to justice, and *decides* that all States shall ensure that their domestic laws and regulations establish serious criminal offenses sufficient to provide the ability to prosecute and to penalize in a manner duly reflecting the seriousness of the offense:

(a) their nationals who travel or attempt to travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality, and other individuals who travel or attempt to travel from their territories to a State other than their States of residence or nationality, for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts, or the providing or receiving of terrorist training;

(b) the wilful provision or collection, by any means, directly or indirectly, of funds by their nationals or in their territories with the intention that the funds should be used, or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in order to finance the travel of individuals who travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist training; and,

(c) the wilful organization, or other facilitation, including acts of recruitment, by their nationals or in their territories, of the travel of individuals who travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist training;

7. *Expresses* its strong determination to consider listing pursuant to resolution 2161 (2014) individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaida who are financing, arming, planning, or recruiting for them, or otherwise supporting their acts or activities, including through information and communications technologies, such as the internet, social media, or any other means;

8. *Decides* that, without prejudice to entry or transit necessary in the furtherance of a judicial process, including in furtherance of such a process related to arrest or detention of a foreign terrorist fighter, Member States shall prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of any individual about whom that State has credible information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that he or she is seeking entry into or transit through their territory for the purpose of participating in the acts described in paragraph 6, including any acts or activities indicating that an individual, group, undertaking or entity is associated with Al-Qaida, as set out in paragraph 2 of resolution 2161 (2014), provided that nothing in this paragraph shall

oblige any State to deny entry or require the departure from its territories of its own nationals or permanent residents;

9. *Calls upon* Member States to require that airlines operating in their territories provide advance passenger information to the appropriate national authorities in order to detect the departure from their territories, or attempted entry into or transit through their territories, by means of civil aircraft, of individuals designated by the Committee established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) ("the Committee"), and further *calls upon* Member States to report any such departure from their territories, or such attempted entry into or transit through their territories, of such individuals to the Committee, as well as sharing this information with the State of residence or nationality, as appropriate and in accordance with domestic law and international obligations;

10. *Stresses* the urgent need to implement fully and immediately this resolution with respect to foreign terrorist fighters, *underscores* the particular and urgent need to implement this resolution with respect to those foreign terrorist fighters who are associated with ISIL, ANF and other cells, affiliates, splinter groups or derivatives of Al-Qaida, as designated by the Committee, and *expresses* its readiness to consider designating, under resolution 2161 (2014), individuals associated with Al-Qaida who commit the acts specified in paragraph 6 above;

International Cooperation

11. *Calls upon* Member States to improve international, regional, and subregional cooperation, if appropriate through bilateral agreements, to prevent the travel of foreign terrorist fighters from or through their territories, including through increased sharing of information for the purpose of identifying foreign terrorist fighters, the sharing and adoption of best practices, and improved understanding of the patterns of travel by foreign terrorist fighters, and for Member States to act cooperatively when taking national measures to prevent terrorists from exploiting technology, communications and resources to incite support for terrorist acts, while respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms and in compliance with other obligations under international law;

12. *Recalls* its decision in resolution 1373 (2001) that Member States shall afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal investigations or proceedings relating to the financing or support of terrorist acts, including assistance in obtaining evidence in their possession necessary for the proceedings, and *underlines* the importance of fulfilling this obligation with respect to such investigations or proceedings involving foreign terrorist fighters;

13. *Encourages* Interpol to intensify its efforts with respect to the foreign terrorist fighter threat and to recommend or put in place additional resources to support and encourage national, regional and international measures to monitor and prevent the transit of foreign terrorist fighters, such as expanding the use of INTERPOL Special Notices to include foreign terrorist fighters;

14. *Calls upon* States to help build the capacity of States to address the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters, including to prevent and interdict foreign terrorist fighter travel across land and maritime borders, in particular the States neighbouring zones of armed conflict where there are foreign terrorist fighters, and

welcomes and *encourages* bilateral assistance by Member States to help build such national capacity;

Countering Violent Extremism in Order to Prevent Terrorism

15. *Underscores* that countering violent extremism, which can be conducive to terrorism, including preventing radicalization, recruitment, and mobilization of individuals into terrorist groups and becoming foreign terrorist fighters is an essential element of addressing the threat to international peace and security posed by foreign terrorist fighters, and *calls upon* Member States to enhance efforts to counter this kind of violent extremism;

16. *Encourages* Member States to engage relevant local communities and non-governmental actors in developing strategies to counter the violent extremist narrative that can incite terrorist acts, address the conditions conducive to the spread of violent extremism, which can be conducive to terrorism, including by empowering youth, families, women, religious, cultural and education leaders, and all other concerned groups of civil society and adopt tailored approaches to countering recruitment to this kind of violent extremism and promoting social inclusion and cohesion;

17. *Recalls* its decision in paragraph 14 of resolution 2161 (2014) with respect to improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaida, and *urges* Member States, in this context, to act cooperatively when taking national measures to prevent terrorists from exploiting technology, communications and resources, including audio and video, to incite support for terrorist acts, while respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms and in compliance with other obligations under international law;

18. *Calls upon* Member States to cooperate and consistently support each other's efforts to counter violent extremism, which can be conducive to terrorism, including through capacity building, coordination of plans and efforts, and sharing lessons learned;

19. *Emphasizes* in this regard the importance of Member States' efforts to develop non-violent alternative avenues for conflict prevention and resolution by affected individuals and local communities to decrease the risk of radicalization to terrorism, and of efforts to promote peaceful alternatives to violent narratives espoused by foreign terrorist fighters, and *underscores* the role education can play in countering terrorist narratives;

United Nations Engagement on the Foreign Terrorist Fighter Threat

20. *Notes* that foreign terrorist fighters and those who finance or otherwise facilitate their travel and subsequent activities may be eligible for inclusion on the Al-Qaida Sanctions List maintained by the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) where they participate in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of, Al-Qaida, supplying, selling or transferring arms and related materiel to, or recruiting for, or otherwise supporting acts or activities of Al-Qaida or any cell, affiliate, splinter group or derivative thereof, and *calls upon* States to propose such foreign terrorist fighters and those

who facilitate or finance their travel and subsequent activities for possible designation;

21. *Directs* the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) and the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, in close cooperation with all relevant United Nations counter-terrorism bodies, in particular CTED, to devote special focus to the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters recruited by or joining ISIL, ANF and all groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaida;

22. *Encourages* the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team to coordinate its efforts to monitor and respond to the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters with other United Nations counter-terrorism bodies, in particular the CTITF;

23. *Requests* the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, in close cooperation with other United Nations counter-terrorism bodies, to report to the Committee established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) within 180 days, and provide a preliminary oral update to the Committee within 60 days, on the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters recruited by or joining ISIL, ANF and all groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaida, including:

(a) a comprehensive assessment of the threat posed by these foreign terrorist fighters, including their facilitators, the most affected regions and trends in radicalization to terrorism, facilitation, recruitment, demographics, and financing; and

(b) recommendations for actions that can be taken to enhance the response to the threat posed by these foreign terrorist fighters;

24. *Requests* the Counter-Terrorism Committee, within its existing mandate and with the support of CTED, to identify principal gaps in Member States' capacities to implement Security Council resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005) that may hinder States' abilities to stem the flow of foreign terrorist fighters, as well as to identify good practices to stem the flow of foreign terrorist fighters in the implementation of resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005), and to facilitate technical assistance, specifically by promoting engagement between providers of capacity-building assistance and recipients, especially those in the most affected regions, including through the development, upon their request, of comprehensive counter-terrorism strategies that encompass countering violent radicalization and the flow of foreign terrorist fighters, recalling the roles of other relevant actors, for example the Global Counterterrorism Forum;

25. *Underlines* that the increasing threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters is part of the emerging issues, trends and developments related to resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005), that, in paragraph 5 of resolution 2129 (2013), the Security Council directed CTED to identify, and therefore merits close attention by the Counter-Terrorism Committee, consistent with its mandate;

26. *Requests* the Committee established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) and the Counter-Terrorism Committee to update the Security Council on their respective efforts pursuant to this resolution;

27. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

United Nations S/2014/689

Security Council

Distr.: General
17 September 2014

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General concerning the credentials of the alternate representatives of Jordan on the Security Council

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received a letter dated 17 September 2014 from the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs and Expatriates of Jordan stating that Ms. Sonia Sughayar and Ms. Nour al-Jazi have been appointed alternate representatives of Jordan on the Security Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, this letter constitutes adequate provisional credentials.

14-61349 (E) 220914

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United Nations S/2014/690

Security Council

Distr.: General
22 September 2014

Original: English

Letter dated 19 September 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to write to you in your capacity as President of the Security Council for the month of September 2014 and attach hereto a list of questions prepared by Russian experts with regard to the investigation of the downing of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 on 17 July 2014 in Donetsk oblast, Ukraine (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would circulate the present letter and its annex as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Vitaly **Churkin**

14-61467 (E) 230914 230914

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Annex to the letter dated 19 September 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

[Original: Russian]

Issues that should be examined during further investigation of the crash of the Malaysia Airlines Boeing 777 aircraft

Activities that should be carried out as a first priority

1. Lay out the pieces of the aircraft structure and analyse the damage to the pieces and possible causes of that damage; this is a customary and mandatory part of the investigation.

2. Search for projectiles at the crash site, in such items as aircraft parts and seat upholstery.

3. Conduct post-mortem examinations of the deceased passengers and crew members, including for the purpose of detecting any projectiles and other foreign objects or substances.

4. Examine data from Ukrainian ground radar, including data from military radar and primary radar data, indicating the movement of the aircraft from the time it entered Ukrainian airspace.

5. Examine communications between the flight crew captured by on-board microphones.

6. Examine radio and telephone communications between air traffic controllers at the Dnepropetrovsk Air Traffic Control Centre and the following:

- Military authorities or Ukrainian Air Defence forces
- The crews of flights SIA-351 (Singapore) and AIC-113 (India)
- Other internal communications among the air traffic controllers

7. Obtain and analyse information about flights of military aircraft in the area of the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine and the crash site.

8. Obtain, analyse and verify information from Ukrainian authorities concerning missile launches scheduled and conducted (both for training purposes, including simulated launches, and for military purposes), including the deployment sites of the forces and materiel involved.

9. Obtain and analyse information on the actual presence and firing of surface-to-air guided missiles and all air defence systems held by the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

10. Obtain and analyse data from other countries involved in the investigation concerning the radar situation in the region (for example, data from United States satellites, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization airborne warning and control system, and surveillance equipment operated by the Russian Federation).

In addition, the information listed below should be examined

With respect to analysis of the situation in the air

11. Recordings of the communications between Ukrainian air traffic authorities and flight crews and between those authorities and adjacent air traffic control centres.

12. Communications between pilots of military aircraft and military authorities and among the pilots themselves in the area of the armed conflict and the crash site.

13. The daily flight plan for Ukrainian military aviation for 17 July 2014.

14. Objective monitoring data on military aircraft located in the area.

15. Information about instructions received by Ukrainian air traffic control authorities from the aviation administration of Ukraine concerning restrictions on the use of the airspace (issuance of Notices to Airmen) in the Donetsk and Lugansk regions, and the related procedures for interaction with aircraft crews and the Ukrainian Air Defence Force.

16. Evidence from aircraft crews flying in the same area on the day of the crash concerning possible interference with the on-board and ground-based navigation equipment.

With respect to the radar situation

17. Information about the number of Ukrainian ground radar units and their functional status.

18. Information about monitoring by the Ukrainian Air Defence Force of the use of the airspace in the area, if such monitoring was carried out, including communications between Air Defence units.

19. Information about the radar tracking of aircraft on 17 July 2014 in the area of the crash and the locations of relevant Ukrainian Armed Forces units.

20. Analysis of data provided earlier by the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation concerning radar centres activated around the time when the crash occurred.

With respect to flight and aircraft preparations

21. Information about the flight crew's preparations for the flight (including whether the crew was informed of current Notices to Airmen, the level at which the aircraft was to fly and the reasons for any changes to the flight plan). In addition, the flight planning by Malaysian Airlines should be examined, including statistical data about previous flights along the flight path followed by flight MH17.

22. Data about the meteorological conditions in the area of the crash, including with respect to their possible influence on changes to the altitude and route of the downed Boeing.

23. Information about any previous refusals of authorization or items missing or inoperative under the minimum equipment list, particularly in terms of navigational equipment.

24. Information about aviation security procedures carried out before and during the flight (screening of passengers, luggage and cargo, and presence of hazardous or prohibited items in cargo).

With respect to examination of the in-flight recorders

25. The data from the digital flight data recorder and the cockpit voice recorder must be analysed, with particular emphasis on the functioning of the navigational equipment and the trajectory parameters.

United Nations S/2014/691

Security Council

Distr.: General
22 September 2014

Original: English

Letter dated 20 September 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to attach herewith a letter dated 20 September 2014 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq addressed to the President of the Security Council (see annex).

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mohamad Ali **Alhakim**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex to the letter dated 20 September 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

[Original: Arabic]

I should like to reaffirm the substance of the letter dated 25 June 2014 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the President of the Security Council (S/2014/440, annex), in which the international community was requested to support the effort to eradicate the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and restore stability to our country.

On 15 September 2014, at the Paris conference, the international community attested to the fact that ISIL represents a threat to Iraq. We welcome the commitment that was made by 26 States to provide the new Iraqi Government with all necessary support in its war against ISIL, including appropriate military assistance through the provision of air cover in coordination with the Iraqi armed forces and in accordance with international law, without endangering the safety of civilians, ensuring that populated areas are not struck and respecting Iraq's sovereignty.

Iraq is grateful for the military assistance it is receiving, including the assistance provided by the United States of America in response to Iraq's specific requests. Iraq and the United States have entered into a Strategic Framework Agreement, and that Agreement will help to make such assistance more effective and enable us to make great advances in our war against ISIL. Although Iraq is in great need of the assistance of its friends in combatting this evil terrorism, it nonetheless attaches great importance to preserving its sovereignty and its ability to take decisions independently, both of which must be honoured in all circumstances.

As we noted in our earlier letter, ISIL has established a safe haven outside Iraq's borders that is a direct threat to the security of our people and territory. By establishing this safe haven, ISIL has secured for itself the ability to train for, plan, finance and carry out terrorist operations across our borders. The presence of this safe haven has made our borders impossible to defend and exposed our citizens to the threat of terrorist attacks.

It is for these reasons that we, in accordance with international law and the relevant bilateral and multilateral agreements, and with due regard for complete national sovereignty and the Constitution, have requested the United States of America to lead international efforts to strike ISIL sites and military strongholds, with our express consent. The aim of such strikes is to end the constant threat to Iraq, protect Iraq's citizens and, ultimately, arm Iraqi forces and enable them to regain control of Iraq's borders.

We are grateful for the international community's support and believe that the provision of additional assistance for the specific purpose of targeting ISIL will further help the Iraqi people and the security forces to turn the tide in the struggle against the terrorists, and thereby restore security and stability in our territory. Doing so will benefit the region and the entire world, from which ISIL must be completely eradicated.

(*Signed*) Ibrahim al-Ushayqir **al-Ja'fari**
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq

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Security Council

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22 September 2014

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Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 2164 (2014) of 25 June 2014, by which the Council renewed the mandate of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), and covers the period from 27 May to 15 September 2014. The Council requested me to report within three months of the adoption of the resolution on the implementation of the Ouagadougou preliminary agreement, the expansion of the Mission's Force presence in the north of Mali and benchmarks to assess progress in the implementation of the priority tasks of the mandate of MINUSMA.

II. Implementation of the preliminary agreement

Political process and inclusive dialogue

2. Since my last report on the situation in Mali (S/2014/403), efforts to establish peace in Mali have seen notable progress. Concerted efforts by Algeria, my Special Representative, the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and regional Governments led to the launch of formal peace negotiations between the armed groups and the Government of Mali, as called for by the preliminary agreement. The first round took place from 14 to 24 July in Algiers, which resulted in the adoption of a road map and a declaration of cessation of hostilities signed separately by the Government of Mali with two respective coalitions of armed groups, the Coordination and the Platform. A second round of negotiations, between the Government and the Coordination, and the Government and the Platform, began in early September and was still ongoing as the present report was published. This round seeks to address political, security, development, and justice and reconciliation issues.

3. In June, Algeria hosted talks with the signatory and adherent parties to the preliminary agreement. On 9 June, the Coordination, comprised of Mouvement national de libération de l'Azawad (MNLA), Haut conseil pour l'unité de l'Azawad (HCUA) and Mouvement arabe de l'Azawad (MAA), signed the Algiers Declaration pledging to coordinate their actions in the search for a negotiated settlement with the Government of Mali. On 14 June, the Platform, comprised of Coordination des mouvements et fronts patriotiques de résistance (CMFPR), Coalition du peuple pour

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l'Azawad (CPA) and another MAA faction, signed the Plateforme préliminaire d'Alger en vue du dialogue inclusif inter-malien, which reaffirmed their commitment to the territorial integrity of Mali.

4. On 15 and 16 June, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Ambassadors of Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and the Niger met in Algiers, affording my Special Representative the opportunity to reiterate the call of the Council for proper coordination among international actors in support of the Malian peace process.

5. The first phase of the Algiers peace negotiations began on 14 July. The talks were supported by a mediation team led by Algeria and comprising the United Nations/MINUSMA, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the African Union, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the European Union and Burkina Faso, Mauritania, the Niger and Chad. This initial phase was dedicated to the elaboration of a road map for negotiations and the security situation in northern Mali. The Coordination and the Platform delegations refused to sit at the same table, leading to a two-track process. As discussions on which armed groups should be represented at the table took place in Algiers, hostilities broke out between elements of MNLA and MAA (Coordination) on one side, and MAA (Platform) and other armed groups (including Imghad militias perceived to be close to the Government) on the other side, in the area of Tabankort (Gao region). As a result of those clashes, the scope of the talks was enlarged to include the negotiation of a cessation of hostilities agreement led by my Special Representative.

6. On 24 July, after two weeks of discussions, the Government of Mali signed two important documents, the road map for negotiations in the context of the Algiers process and the declaration of cessation of hostilities, separately with both the Coordination and the Platform. The two-track nature of the process remains a challenge for the negotiation of a comprehensive and inclusive peace process.

7. The road map reaffirms the key principles enacted by the preliminary agreement — respect for Mali's unity, territorial integrity and secularism — and provides the framework for the negotiations. It organizes the talks around four thematic areas: political and institutional issues; defence and security issues; economic development, social and cultural issues; and reconciliation, justice and humanitarian issues. While no provision was made for the direct involvement of civil society in the talks, the parties subsequently agreed to organize "hearings" with civil society in Algiers immediately before the second round of negotiations. On 21 August, Algeria and Mali agreed that each of the three parties (Government, Coordination and Platform) would nominate 18 members of local communities and civil society organizations to participate in these sessions.

8. The declaration of cessation of hostilities, signed in response to the clashes in the Tabankort area (Gao region), reaffirms the commitment of the parties to the preliminary agreement, to the ceasefire agreement of 23 May and to Security Council resolution 2164 (2014). The parties agreed to establish a Joint Commission comprising representatives from the Government of Mali and the armed groups, to be chaired by MINUSMA, to lead mediation efforts on the ground to consolidate the cessation of hostilities.

9. From 25 to 28 August, the Platform and the Coordination met in Ouagadougou to discuss the peace process and enhance coherence ahead of the second phase of

negotiations in Algiers. Following a request from the Government and the armed groups for tailored training on negotiation skills and thematic areas, MINUSMA funded the organization of training sessions in the margins of the meeting. At the conclusion of their meeting, the armed groups signed a joint declaration promising, inter alia, to "end hostilities among the people of northern Mali".

10. The civil society "hearings" took place from 4 to 9 September. The representatives exchanged views on the root causes of the conflict and shared proposals in the four thematic areas of the road map. While the "hearings" suggested a commonality of views on the root causes of the conflict, they also illustrated the diversity of views among the various stakeholders on the way forward. The thematic groups' chairs have since summarized and presented the recommendations from the "hearings" to the entire mediation team. Meanwhile, the mediation team and the parties continued discussions on the process and the format of the negotiations.

11. In an effort to build consensus on the outcomes of the first round of negotiations, President Keïta initiated consultations with key stakeholders, including Malian Defence and Security Forces, political leaders, senior civil servants and civil society to share information on the negotiation process and solicit views. On 31 July, Prime Minister Moussa Mara briefed the Presidents of the National Assembly, the High Court of Justice, the Economic, Social and Cultural Council and members of the Supreme Court on the road map and the declaration of cessation of hostilities. He held similar meetings with the High Council of the *collectivités territoriales* and women leaders on 1 August, and with political parties on 5 August.

12. MINUSMA and national authorities also organized a series of workshops to facilitate the contribution of political parties and civil society to the dialogue and reconciliation process. This series of workshops gathered journalists in Selingué from 29 May to 1 June, women leaders in Bamako on 15 and 16 July, and a local youth organization in Ségou from 5 to 7 August. Finally, from 12 to 14 August, representatives of 192 political parties, members of the presidential majority and the opposition participated in a three-day consultative workshop on the peace process. The political parties recommended, inter alia, more transparency on the management of the crisis in the north and the inclusion of political parties and civil society organizations in the negotiations in Algiers.

Cessation of hostilities

13. The reporting period was marred by ceasefire violations — territorial gains made by the armed groups and clashes between armed groups including self-defence militias, reportedly ethnic-based and close to the Government — and human rights violations, in particular serious violations of children's rights in contravention of article 10 of the preliminary agreement. The Malian Defence and Security Forces have largely withdrawn from the north following the resumption of hostilities in Kidal in May. They exert effective control only over the cities of Gao and Timbuktu. While 1,214 members of the Forces continue to share bases with MINUSMA in Tessalit (Kidal region) and Ménaka (Gao region), their weapons are stored and they rarely exit the camps.

14. Article 10 of the preliminary agreement and the ceasefire agreement of 23 May provides for the end of all military operations and attempts to occupy new positions.

However, on 30 May, MNLA and MAA (Coordination) occupied Ber town, 60 km east of Timbuktu. On 19 June, MINUSMA confirmed that MNLA had taken control of N'Tillit, 140 km south-west of Gao, where elements of CPA are also present. On 26 July, suspected MNLA elements reportedly entered and paraded in Bamba (Gao region).

15. With regard to fighting between armed groups, on 11 July, south-west of Anefis (Kidal region), elements from MNLA/MAA (Coordination) clashed with MAA (Platform) and armed groups perceived to be close to the Government. On 12 July, the Platform and its allies established control over an area adjacent to Tabankort (Gao region), 40 km south-west of Anefis. On 19 and 20 July, in Tabankort, fighting erupted anew between MNLA and MAA (Platform), who reportedly captured prisoners. Following negotiations led by my Special Representative, on 21 July, MNLA handed over to MINUSMA 11 non-combatant prisoners affiliated with MAA (Platform). Meanwhile, the latter confirmed that about 20 fighters from MNLA and MAA (Coordination) were in its custody. On 24 July, the Government of Mali signed the declaration of cessation of hostilities with the Coordination and the Platform, respectively, in Algiers. On 9 August, further clashes erupted in Lerneb (Timbuktu region) between MAA (Platform) and MAA (Coordination). MINUSMA troops, deployed in Lerneb on 12 August, facilitated a cessation of hostilities that enabled the return of civilians to the area.

16. The Commission technique mixte de sécurité, established by article 7 of the preliminary agreement, resumed its work during the reporting period. On 13 June, the parties developed the implementation modalities of the ceasefire agreement of 23 May. On 16 July, they designed mixed observation and monitoring teams, which comprise representatives of the MINUSMA force, the Malian Defence and Security Forces, MNLA, HCUA and MAA (Coordination). The mixed observation and monitoring teams are mandated to assess reported allegations of abuse and/or provocations by the parties of the ceasefire agreement of 23 May. The first mixed observation and monitoring team was deployed from 23 to 25 July to Tessit, Tillit and Ndaki (Gao region) to investigate the presence of armed groups in these areas. It reported on 30 July to the MINUSMA Force Commander in his capacity as President of the Commission technique mixte de sécurité. As at 15 September, two other mixed observation and monitoring teams were waiting for the endorsement of the Commission technique mixte de sécurité to start operations in Kidal and Timbuktu regions.

17. The Joint Commission established by the 24 July declaration of cessation of hostilities was also chaired by MINUSMA, but, unlike the Commission technique mixte de sécurité, it included the Platform and the Coordination. The Commission held its first meetings in Gao, Tabankort and Anefis between 30 July and 7 August, including consultations with the representatives of the warring factions in Anefis and Tabankort. The Commission recommended the reinforcement of the MINUSMA presence in the Tabankort, Anefis, Almoustarat and Tarkint areas through the deployment of ground and air patrols and the establishment of checkpoints. It also recommended that the Commission technique mixte de sécurité send the mixed observation and monitoring team to these areas and define terms for the liberation of prisoners. MINUSMA positioned forces in Almoustarat and Tabankort, from where they cover Tarkint and Anefis, respectively. This encouraged the return of the civilian population and facilitated access for humanitarian actors. The Gao mixed observation and monitoring team monitored the ceasefire in and around Tabankort.

An initial exchange of prisoners took place in August, but outside the Commission technique mixte de sécurité framework (see below). On 7 August, the Commission finalized its work and submitted its final report to Algeria as lead mediator. With the resumption of talks in Algiers, the parties agreed to disband the Commission. Should new confrontations arise, they will be examined by the Commission technique mixte de sécurité and the mixed observation and monitoring teams.

18. On 12 September, on the margins of the negotiations in Algiers, the Government, the Coordination and the Platform agreed to open the membership of the Commission technique mixte de sécurité to CMFPR, CPA, MAA (Coalition), and MAA (Platform), as well as to representatives from Algeria, Chad, Mauritania and the Niger, and to adjust the Mixed Observation and Monitoring Team accordingly.

19. The breaches of the ceasefire increased security risks for civilians and resulted in human rights violations, in breach of article 10 of the preliminary agreement. After MNLA took the town of Aguelhok on 21 May, 66 Imghad Tuareg civilian men, fearing for their security, sought refuge in the MINUSMA camp. They stayed there until 3 July, when MINUSMA negotiated their safe return with MNLA and HCUA. The clashes that took place from 11 to 26 July in Anefis and Tabankort resulted in the killing of at least 4 civilians and the forced displacement of 56 women and 72 children. On 18 August, six men were severely beaten by MNLA in Ménaka (Gao region) for wearing t-shirts bearing the colours of the Malian flag. In Lerneb, MAA (Coordination) has curtailed the movements of members of the Arab community suspected of being MAA (Platform) sympathizers.

20. MINUSMA confirmed the presence of children in the ranks of MNLA, HCUA and MAA (both Coordination and Platform) in Timbuktu, Mopti, Gao and Kidal regions. The Mission also documented the military use of at least 12 schools by MNLA, HCUA, MAA (Coordination) and CPA. On 4 September in Ber, with the support of MINUSMA, the joint MAA-MNLA military leadership committed to sign a command order prohibiting the recruitment of children and to allow the Mission to screen its troops on 16 and 17 September. While two boys detained by the Government for their alleged association with armed groups were released during the July prisoner exchange between the Government and armed groups in northern Mali, five children remain in Government detention. The Ministry of Justice has pledged to swiftly address this matter and appointed a new government focal point for all issues related to children on 9 June. Meanwhile, MINUSMA came across four alleged minors in the course of prison monitoring visits carried out on 30 and 31 July. Should it be confirmed that they are below 18 years of age, the number of children detained by the Government for their alleged association with armed groups would be nine.

21. While article 11 of the preliminary agreement provides for the cantonment and progressive redeployment of the Malian Defence and Security Forces, the operation of the three pre-cantonment sites was suspended and the progressive deployment of the Malian Defence and Security Forces derailed by the resumption of hostilities in Kidal in May. MINUSMA suspended the provision of food to and the construction of the first three pre-cantonment sites in Kidal region. During the Commission technique mixte de sécurité meetings, the Government said it was ready to proceed with reconnaissance of future cantonment sites. The signatory groups held that such a decision should be taken at the political level by the Comité de suivi et

d'évaluation established by the preliminary agreement, but Comité meetings to date have been postponed.

22. The "cantonment" that emerged from the initiative of CMFPR I and II, MAA (Platform) and its pro-Government allies in the Gao, Mopti and Timbuktu regions, is a source of concern. CMFPR I and II are regrouping some of their elements in the hope that they will be included in future cantonment/disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes. In Ansongo (Gao region), some 500 elements, few of whom carried light weapons, regrouped for one week in early July. Such gatherings may have been recruitment drives or posturing ahead of the start of the second phase of negotiations in Algiers. MINUSMA organized a series of awareness-raising meetings in the north on the purpose of cantonment and on the mandate of MINUSMA in this regard.

Deployment of administrative and social services, humanitarian access and confidence-building measures

23. Security concerns, accentuated by the low deployment of defence and security forces, hampered the redeployment of the civilian administration in the northern regions, as called for by article 12 of the preliminary agreement. In the aftermath of the May events, 1 governor (Kidal) and 26 prefects and subprefects from the Gao, Kidal and Mopti regions left their posts in the north. Currently, 60 per cent of prefects and 75 per cent of subprefects are deployed in the Gao, Mopti and Timbuktu regions. Armed groups have created a parallel administration for the management of public affairs in Kidal and Ménaka called "city management commissions".

24. Since my last report (S/2014/403), some 118 judicial personnel and magistrates have redeployed to the Gao, Mopti and Timbuktu regions. There are still, however, no representatives of the judiciary in Kidal, which remains a concern. Meanwhile, the Government passed on 4 July a decree appointing additional prosecutors and magistrates nationwide. In support of the redeployment of State administration, MINUSMA and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) organized a series of workshops in June and July to train some 140 magistrates, judicial police officers, prison administrators and guards in Gao, Timbuktu and Mopti regions, including 29 women. On 29 August, the Prime Minister travelled to Timbuktu and Niafunke to inaugurate public offices — a prefecture, a subprefecture, tribunals and a gendarmerie — that had been renovated under a joint UNDP-MINUSMA project.

25. In accordance with article 12 of the preliminary agreement, access to basic social services had improved before the resumption of hostilities in May. In the area of education, thanks to the "back-to-school" campaign led by the Ministry of Education, with the support of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and other partners, 983 schools reopened (74 per cent of a total of 1,320 schools operating before the crisis) and 4,424 teachers resumed their functions (77 per cent of the 5,772 teachers posted in the north before the crisis). However, following the May events, seven schools closed in Kidal, preventing 772 children from completing the 2013/14 academic year. In the health sector, access to basic health services improved in Gao and Timbuktu, while the situation in Kidal remains precarious. The World Health Organization (WHO) funded the return of 70 per cent

of health workers in areas affected by the conflict, and UNICEF supported 105 health facilities with medical supplies. However, only 50 per cent of health workers remained in Gao and Timbuktu regions as at July 2014, owing to the insecurity.

26. Article 13 of the preliminary agreement provides that the parties will facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance but security concerns continue to hamper humanitarian operations. Following threats to its staff, one international non-governmental organization suspended its operations in the Kidal region in early August. On 4 August, in Kidal, the Humanitarian Coordinator stressed to the armed groups and communities that it was essential that they help ensure the safety of humanitarian workers. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs subsequently undertook outreach missions to Ménaka, Kidal and Ouagadougou. Armed groups and humanitarian actors agreed to strengthen exchanges and establish monthly local civil-military coordination meetings.

27. In spite of article 13 of the preliminary agreement calling upon the parties to facilitate the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees, the resumption of hostilities has led to new displacements and reversed a trend of steady returns to the northern regions by IDPs and refugees (even if mostly to urban centres). Only 10,000 IDPs returned to the north since my last report, and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has not registered any refugee returns. Burkina Faso, Mauritania and the Niger continue to host some 140,000 Malian refugees (compared with 177,000 at the height of displacement). On 26 and 27 August, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees visited Mali and stressed the need for security and political stability to create a conducive environment for the safe, voluntary and sustainable return of refugees and displaced people.

28. Article 18 of the preliminary agreement provides for the release of all conflict-related detainees. On 15 July, the Government of Mali released 42 conflict-related detainees, all members and sympathizers of MNLA, HCUA or MAA (Coordination) whose names were included in a list of 69 names presented by these armed groups. In return, the armed groups released the 45 members of the Malian Defence and Security Forces captured during the fighting in Kidal in May. In some cases, the release of prisoners who were under investigation or charged with war crimes, terrorism, religious crimes and ethnic crimes raises concerns, as these measures may hamper Mali's obligations to investigate, prosecute and provide redress for violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. The Government released a former member of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) on 8 July, a former leader of the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) on 9 August and a MUJAO member appointed to judicial functions by the terrorist groups during the occupation of the north on 15 August, on various legal grounds, including lack of evidence and procedural flaws. Two of these names were on the list presented by the armed groups.

29. Article 18 of the preliminary agreement and the ceasefire agreement of 23 May also called for the establishment of an international commission of inquiry on serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. On 10 July, the Minister of Justice and Human Rights wrote to me seeking United Nations support for the establishment of such an international commission of inquiry to look into serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law

committed between 1 January 2012 and the establishment of the commission. In line with Security Council resolution 2164 (2014), I have asked MINUSMA to develop draft terms of reference and to share them with all the parties to the preliminary agreement.

III. Expansion of the Mission presence in northern Mali

30. As at 1 September, MINUSMA had reached 71 per cent of its planned deployment figures for both uniformed and civilian personnel. Over 80 per cent of all MINUSMA staff and 90 per cent of uniformed personnel are already based in the northern regions.

31. The Force is present outside major urban centres and conducts regular long-range patrols in rural areas. In addition to its four main bases in Gao, Kidal, Tessalit and Timbuktu and the smaller camps of Aguelhok Ansongo, Diabali, Douentsa, Gossi, Goundam, Ménaka and Sevarée, the Force established temporary detachments in Ber, Léré and Lerneb and a presence in Tabankort and Anefis during the reporting period.

32. The Force has also been able to enhance measures for the protection of civilians, thanks to the deployment of key force multipliers. The MINUSMA All Source Information Fusion Unit, based in Gao, has become fully operational, substantially enhancing the Mission situational awareness. Starting in June, the Mission's four attack helicopters have conducted an average of five surveillance missions weekly, with a specific focus on the protection of civilian populations in the north. Three unarmed unmanned aerial systems have also started surveillance flights. In June, 96 Special Operation Forces elements deployed to Gao and started weekly monitoring patrols in the region, focusing on areas not covered by the MINUSMA military bases.

33. On 31 May, following the entry of MNLA/MAA (Coordination) fighters in Ber (Timbuktu region), MINUSMA established a temporary presence there. Patrols are still ongoing, in spite of the suicide attack against the Mission that killed two peacekeepers and injured seven others in Ber on 16 August. Following clashes between MNLA/MAA (Coordination) and MAA (Platform) and its allied forces in the region of Tabankort (Gao region), MINUSMA conducted four air surveillance missions over the area on 14, 19 and 20 July. The Force established a temporary detachment in Tabankort on 12 July and started conducting daily ground patrols in the Anefis and Tabankort areas on 14 July.

34. Planning for the further expansion of the Mission's presence through mobile and static means, as mandated under Security Council resolution 2164 (2014), is under way. Many of the tasks to be performed in these locations, however, remain contingent on progress in the Algiers peace negotiations. During the reporting period, MINUSMA developed new plans to expand the Mission outreach beyond the main population centres, as provided by Security Council resolution 2164 (2014). This expansion is likely to have a significant budgetary impact, as the current 2014-2015 budget only provided for the construction of four main bases, in Gao, Kidal, Tessalit and Timbuktu. Construction efforts at the four main bases are progressing; contractors have completed 60 per cent of horizontal works in Gao and Timbuktu and 25 per cent in Kidal; they are mobilizing equipment to start work in Tessalit. The two military engineering companies are currently constructing two

minor camps in Ansongo and Aguelhok. The proportion of civilian staff deployed in the north should start increasing in the first quarter of 2015, with a target of 50 per cent of all civilian staff to be based in the north, subject to finalization of construction at the Mission's main deployment locations (mostly Gao and Timbuktu) and the availability of sufficient minimum operating security standards: compliant accommodation and office space.

35. Construction efforts in northern Mali are hindered by security and climate conditions, which limit the capacity of key enablers and contractors. Adverse weather conditions affect the air and road movements of the Mission. Travel time by road to destinations in northern Mali increases on average by 50 per cent during the rainy season, prolonging the commitment of the Force for the protection of convoys. Additionally, although all military engineering units have deployed (one combat military engineering company and three construction military engineering companies), one of the construction engineering companies continues to lack requisite heavy engineering equipment. MINUSMA still has no military utility helicopters at its disposal, and has compensated for the absence of military utility helicopters by contracting commercial helicopters. (Three CH-47 military heavy transport helicopters arrived in Mali during the reporting period; they are expected to be operational on 1 October.) A C-130 military transport aircraft deployed on 1 September (a three-month commitment). The arrival of a commercial Aero Medical Evacuation Team on 28 July has enhanced the strategic medical evacuation capacity of the Mission. French forces have, however, continued assisting MINUSMA with essential in extremis support, including medical evacuation.

Safety and security challenges

36. The withdrawal of the Malian Defence and Security Forces from most of northern Mali, the absence of effective control by the armed groups over the areas gained from the Malian Defence and Security Forces in May and the gradual drawdown and reconfiguration of French operation Serval/Barkhane have given way to a marked increase in the activities of extremist groups. With its network of bases and its extended movements, MINUSMA has become their primary target.

37. Between 27 May and 15 September, a total of 27 attacks targeted MINUSMA premises and personnel (15 improvised explosive device or mine incidents and 12 rocket or mortar fire incidents). On 11 June, in Aguelhok, a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device killed four peacekeepers and injured six, along with four Malian Defence and Security Forces elements. On 30 June, 20 km west of Timbuktu, an improvised explosive device attack killed one peacekeeper and wounded seven others; the device was likely operated by remote control. On 18 July, a MINUSMA force convoy was hit by a remote-controlled improvised explosive device 500 metres from the Kidal MINUSMA camp. One peacekeeper was injured. On 20 July, MINUSMA vehicles ran over two improvised explosive devices in the vicinity of Aguelhok, slightly wounding one peacekeeper. On 14 August, two peacekeepers were injured when their vehicle hit an improvised explosive device on the Tessalit-Aguelhok road. On 15 August, one peacekeeper was injured owing to an improvised explosive device/mine explosion near Agulehok. On 16 August, the MINUSMA temporary presence in Ber (Timbuktu region) was attacked by a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device, resulting in two peacekeepers killed and seven injured. On 29 August, a Force

vehicle hit a mine on the Tessalit-Aguelhok road, injuring nine peacekeepers, including two seriously. On 2 September, an explosive device, suspected to be an improvised explosive device loaded with home-made explosives, killed four peacekeepers and wounded 14 others on the road between Kidal and Aguelhok. On 14 September, a MINUSMA military vehicle hit an improvised explosive device during a patrol conducted in the vicinity of Aguelhok. One peacekeeper was killed by the explosion, and four others were wounded. The Mission has developed a counter-improvised explosive device action plan that includes strengthened physical measures, specialized equipment and additional pre- and post-deployment training for MINUSMA staff and contingents.

38. Two improvised explosive device incidents occurred in the vicinity of the Kidal airstrip on 10 July and 29 July, affecting movement of supplies and personnel. On 10 July, a vehicle conducting runway security clearance drove over an anti-tank mine that partially detonated. On 29 July, while conducting regular maintenance of the Kidal airstrip, a MINUSMA force heavy duty vehicle hit an improvised explosive device 20 metres from the runway, wouding one peacekeeper. There were no fatalities, but the runway was closed for 30 days. The Mission built a ditch and a berm and erected observation towers and light towers to prevent intrusions on the runway, which reopened on 29 August.

39. Mission facilities continued to be targeted by rocket attacks. The risk level further escalated during the reporting period, as MINUSMA also came under mortar fire. On 12 July, three rockets exploded south of Timbuktu airport. On 15 July, a 122-mm rocket landed 1 km northwest of the MINUSMA camp in Aguelhok. On 17 July, another rocket was launched 1 km east of the MINUSMA camp in Tessalit. On 22 July, two mortar bombs were fired near the MINUSMA camp in Aguelhok. The mortars respectively landed 68 and 70 metres east of the camp. On 27 August, eight mortar shells were fired towards the MINUSMA camp in Aguelhok; two landed respectively within 50 and 65 metres of the MINUSMA camp. None of these incidents caused casualties or damage.

40. On 31 August, AQIM claimed responsibility for the 30 June attack near Timbuktu, the Ber attack of 16 August and the rockets launched against Timbuktu airport on 12 July.

41. From 3 to 10 September, MINUSMA conducted operations with the support of its armed helicopters on the Tessalit-Aguelhok axis in order to impede the access of terrorist groups and reduce pressure on MINUSMA units based in Aguelhok. On 4 September, the Mission force arrested a person accused of having planned an attack against MINUSMA and handed him over to Malian gendarmerie in Bamako.

42. Heavy storms have also been a source of concern for the safety of MINUSMA personnel. On 28 June, a violent storm caused extensive damage to the town of Aguelhok and the MINUSMA camp there. On 22 July, a sandstorm damaged 95 per cent of the tents in the MINUSMA Kidal camp; 31 peacekeepers were injured, including five seriously, and one peacekeeper succumbed from his injuries on 31 August. On 2 August, another violent storm destroyed all the MINUSMA tents in Tessalit, injuring one peacekeeper. On 18 August, thunderstorms damaged the Tessalit base, which is jointly occupied by MINUSMA, the Malian Defence and Security Forces and French Operation Barkhane, killing two Malian soldiers and injuring two others. MINUSMA is procuring new tents that resist winds up to 150 km/hour.

Ebola virus disease

43. To date, no case of Ebola virus disease has been reported in Mali. Yet, Ebola cases have been confirmed in north-eastern Guinea, in an area bordering the southern part of Mali, relatively close to the capital, Bamako. Moreover, the three intensely affected countries — Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone — and the two countries with localized transmission — Nigeria and Senegal — all contribute troops to MINUSMA. The Ebola case confirmed in Senegal may have further implications for the Mission, as the referral level III hospital towards which the most severe cases are evacuated is located in Dakar. In addition, Senegal is the MINUSMA evacuation location in case of emergency. The Mission has put in place close epidemiological surveillance and movement control measures for personnel travelling from, to and through countries affected by Ebola. In August, MINUSMA postponed the deployment of a Nigerian formed police unit and the arrival of a convoy of equipment from Guinea pending medical clearance. The Mission has conducted bi-weekly awareness-raising sessions for staff and set up an isolation ward near the military camp close to Bamako airport.

IV. Development of benchmarks

44. Resolution 2164 (2014) requested me to report on benchmarks to assess progress on the implementation of the priority tasks of the mandate of MINUSMA. On 19 August, the MINUSMA leadership agreed with the Minister for Foreign Affairs that MINUSMA and the Government would collaborate to develop benchmarks that can reflect a shared understanding of priority actions in the context of the mandate of MINUSMA. Terms of reference are being finalized. In line with existing United Nations and Government plans, the Mission will also consult the country team and other key partners. Benchmarks, indicators and monitoring mechanisms will be included in my next report due in December.

V. Observations

45. The start of the second phase of negotiations in Algiers represents a positive step forward on the road to peace and reconciliation in Mali. The delay of the talks since the signing of the Ouagadougou preliminary agreement has had negative consequences for Mali and its citizens, as illustrated by the resumption of armed hostilities in May and more recently by the increasing number of inter-community clashes in northern Mali. I urge the Government, the armed movements and all civil society actors to intensify their efforts to work together in earnest, in close cooperation with my Special Representative, to bring about a process that delivers on the hopes of the Malian people. I welcome the leading role of Algeria in organizing the talks and the coordination role played by my Special Representative, as well as the involvement of ECOWAS, the African Union, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the European Union, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Niger and Chad in the mediation effort.

46. The ongoing talks in Algiers present an opportunity that cannot be missed, if Mali is to find a sustainable solution to the recent crisis. All armed movements in Mali should cease hostilities immediately and prioritize the preparations for the

cantonment process, as provided by the preliminary agreement, in order to show their commitment to peace and security and to build confidence during the talks. Moreover, all parties should recognize the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the Malian State. I encourage all parties to negotiate in good faith and in a spirit of inclusiveness so as to address all grievances. I also call on all parties to strongly condemn, reject and actively combat acts of terrorism, recognizing that they are criminal and unjustifiable, regardless of their motivation, wherever, whenever and by whomever committed.

47. I salute the efforts undertaken by President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta to apprise various segments of Malian society on the political process prior to the second round of peace negotiation in Algiers. It was also positive that the second phase of the Algiers peace negotiations started with exchanges involving civil society representatives. The modalities for the inclusion of all northern communities in the peace process — as provided by article 21 of the preliminary agreement — remain to be defined. The success of the Algiers talks is critical to the long-term stability of the entire country. This can only be achieved through an inclusive process that is supported across the entire country.

48. Despite the launch of the negotiation process in Algeria, the increasing number of clashes in the Tabankort, Ber and Lerneb areas remains a serious concern, which will no doubt continue to weigh heavily on the Algiers negotiations and the security situation on the ground. I call on the leaders of all parties to take steps to prevent further hostilities, including calling for restraint on the part of their allies. I am wary of the risk that fighting between armed groups may give way to intercommunal clashes similar to those that claimed many lives earlier this year, and which may ultimately derail the peace process.

49. I commend the quick intervention of the Mission in many locations where clashes took place and in areas with high risks of confrontation through the deployment of peacekeepers and mediation efforts to ease the tension and protect civilians. All parties should be reminded that these clashes are against the letter and spirit of the Ouagadougou preliminary agreement, the ceasefire agreement and the ongoing talks in Algiers.

50. The resumption of the work of the Commission technique mixte de sécurité and the establishment of the mixed observation and monitoring team in Gao to monitor ceasefire violations is a welcome step. Through the operationalization of this first Mixed Observation and Monitoring Team, MINUSMA has been able to increase its efforts to support the implementation of the ceasefire agreement and to contribute to confidence building between the Government and the Coordination. I call on the Government and the two coalitions of armed groups, the Coordination and the Platform members of the Algiers process, to work together and in collaboration with MINUSMA towards the establishment of the remaining mixed observation and monitoring teams. This is necessary to allow the effective monitoring of ceasefire violations in the other northern regions of Mali.

51. I remain concerned about the continuing restricted access to basic services faced by ordinary citizens across northern Mali, including health care and schools, particularly in view of the beginning of the academic year in Mali in October 2014. Moreover, I regret that humanitarian workers in Kidal have been threatened. I encourage constructive engagement by all parties in order to guarantee respect for humanitarian principles and protection of civilians. I call upon all parties to

unconditionally respect their commitment to guarantee full access of humanitarian organizations across northern Mali and to ensure the safety of humanitarian workers at all times, in accordance with Security Council resolution 2164 (2014). It is critical that all parties continue to work closely with MINUSMA to facilitate the protection of civilians and expand humanitarian and development access.

52. The recent release of three known perpetrators of violations of human rights and international humanitarian law during the crisis of 2012 is concerning. It sends the wrong message regarding accountability for human rights violations. All perpetrators of violations and human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law should be held accountable. I call on the Government of Mali to pay due concern to the need to bring perpetrators of violent crimes to justice and to continue to cooperate with the International Criminal Court, in accordance with Mali's obligations under the Rome Statute. I also remind the armed groups of their repeated commitments to promote and protect human rights, and urge them to distance themselves from perpetrators of human rights violations.

53. I have been profoundly saddened by the death of 12 peacekeepers and the injuries inflicted to 51 others in the course of the past three months. I take this opportunity to express once again my condolences to the families and to the Governments of the deceased peacekeepers, and wish a full and speedy recovery to those injured. Acts of terrorism are criminal and unjustifiable. I count on the Government of Mali to do its utmost to swiftly investigate these attacks and bring the perpetrators to justice.

54. I commend MINUSMA for its efforts to expand its presence outside the main population centres in the north, as requested by the Security Council. MINUSMA has already established 12 bases in the north, from where peacekeepers continue to operate in extremely challenging security and climatic circumstances. The Mission is deploying considerable efforts to upgrade existing bases and establish new ones, in addition to efforts to expand the Mission outreach through increased long-range patrolling and other mobile approaches. The expansion of the Mission presence is, however, going to be a long-term and costly endeavour, for which we will continue to require support from Member States. It should be underlined that MINUSMA operates in a particularly complex security environment characterized by asymmetric attacks that requires the full deployment of all assets as soon as possible.

55. I welcome the proactive steps taken by the Mission to mitigate the risks of Ebola contamination. I encourage the Mission to remain alert and to contribute to the contingency planning undertaken by the Government and WHO, as well as the rest of the United Nations system. MINUSMA will also coordinate very closely with the planned United Nations Mission for Ebola Emergency Response to ensure complementarity of efforts and efficient use of available assets, including on preparedness aspects.

56. Lastly, I wish to express my appreciation to my Special Representative for Mali, Albert Gerard Koenders, and to all United Nations civilian and uniformed personnel in Mali for their continued hard work in very difficult conditions to restore lasting peace and stability in the country. I would also like to thank all troop- and police-contributing countries, the African Union, ECOWAS, the European Union and bilateral partners, United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, non-governmental organizations and all other partners for their important contributions to support the peace process in Mali.

Annex I


MINUSMA
Deployment
as at 15 September 2014
National capital
Regional capital
Town, village
Major airport
International boundary
Regional boundary
Sector line
Main road
Other road
Track
Railroad
In process of deployment
ALGERIA
MAURITANIA
NIGER
NIGERIA
BENIN
TOGO
GHANA
BURKINA FASO
GUINEA
SENEGAL
Sector WEST
Sector EAST
Tombouctou (Timbuktu)
Gao
Kidal
Bamako
Mopti
Ségou
Sikasso
Koulikoro
Kayes
Ménaka
Ansongo
Niamey
Ouagadougou
Abidjan
Conakry
Dakar
Banjul
Bissau
KIDAL
GAO
TOMBOUCTOU
MOPTI
SEGOU
KOULIKORO
KAYES
SIKASSO
0 100 200 300 km
0 100 200 250 mi
Map No. 4536 Rev. 5 UNITED NATIONS
September 2014

Annex II

United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali: military and police strength as at 1 September 2014

	Military			*Police*								
	Staff officers and units			*Individual police officers*			*Formed police units*			*Total Police*		
Country	*Male*	*Female*	*Total*	*Male*	*Female*	*Total*	*Male*	*Female*	*Total*	*Male*	*Female*	*Total*
Albania			–			–			–			–
Algeria			–			–			–			–
Argentina			–			–			–			–
Armenia			–			–			–			–
Australia			–			–			–			–
Austria			–			–			–			–
Bangladesh	1 451	4	1 455			–	139		139	139		139
Belgium			–	9	1	10			–	9	1	10
Benin	253		253			–			–			–
Bolivia			–			–			–			–
Bosnia and Herzegovina			–			–			–			–
Botswana			–			–			–			–
Brazil			–			–			–			–
Brunei Darussalam			–			–			–			–
Bulgaria			–			–			–			–
Burkina Faso	850	10	860	16	2	18			–	16	2	18
Burundi			–	11		11			–	11		11
Cambodia	304	4	308			–			–			–
Cameroon			–	5		5			–	5		5
Canada			–			–			–			–
Central African Republic			–			–			–			–
Chad	1 205		1 205	6		6			–			6
Chile			–			–			–			–
China	389	12	401			–			–			–
Colombia			–			–			–			–
Congo			–			–			–			–
Côte d'Ivoire	121		121	7		7			–	7		7
Croatia			–			–			–			–
Cyprus			–			–			–			–
Czech Republic			–			–			–			–

	Military			Police								
	Staff officers and units			Individual police officers			Formed police units			Total Police		
Country	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Democratic Republic of the Congo			–	5	1	6			–	5	1	6
Denmark	9	1	10			–			–			–
Djibouti			–	1		1			–	1		1
Dominica			–			–			–			–
Dominican Republic	1	1	2									
Ecuador			–			–			–			–
Egypt			–	2		2			–	2		2
El Salvador			–			–			–			–
Estonia	2		2			–			–			–
Ethiopia			–									
Fiji			–			–			–			–
Finland	6		6			–			–			–
France	15		15	5		5			–	5		5
Gabon			–			–			–			–
Gambia	2		2			–			–			–
Germany	5	2	7	7	1	8			–	7	1	8
Ghana	160		160	1		1			–	1		1
Greece			–			–			–			–
Grenada			–			–			–			–
Guatemala			–			–			–			–
Guinea	164		164	2	1	3			–	2	1	3
Guinea-Bissau	1		1			–			–			–
Honduras			–			–			–			–
Hungary			–			–			–			–
Iceland			–			–			–			–
India			–			–			–			–
Indonesia			–			–			–			–
Ireland			–			–			–			–
Israel			–			–			–			–
Italy	2		2			–			–			–
Jamaica			–			–			–			–
Japan			–			–			–			–
Jordan			–	2		2			–	2		2
Kazakhstan			–			–			–			–
Kenya	1		1			–			–			–

	Military			Police								
	Staff officers and units			Individual police officers			Formed police units			Total Police		
Country	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Kyrgyzstan			–			–			–			–
Lesotho			–			–			–			–
Liberia	45	4	49			–			–			–
Libya			–			–			–			–
Lithuania			–			–			–			–
Luxembourg			–			–			–			–
Madagascar			–	2		2			–	2		2
Malawi			–			–			–			–
Malaysia			–			–			–			–
Mauritania	6		6			–			–			–
Moldova, Republic of			–			–			–			–
Mongolia			–			–			–			–
Montenegro			–			–			–			–
Morocco			–			–			–			–
Mozambique			–			–			–			–
Namibia			–			–			–			–
Nepal	141	4	145	12		12			–	12		12
Netherlands	519	20	539			–			–			–
New Zealand			–			–			–			–
Niger	858	4	862	5	1	6			–	5	1	6
Nigeria	162	14	176	1		1	120	20	140	121	20	141
Norway	16	2	18			–			–			–
Pakistan			–			–			–			–
Palau			–			–			–			–
Papua New Guinea			–			–			–			–
Paraguay			–			–			–			–
Peru			–			–			–			–
Philippines			–			–			–			–
Poland			–			–			–			–
Portugal	49		49			–			–			–
Qatar			–			–			–			–
Republic of Korea			–			–			–			–
Romania			–			–			–			–
Russian Federation			–			–			–			–
Rwanda	6		6	2	1	3	123	17	140	125	18	143

Country	Military			Police								
	Staff officers and units			Individual police officers			Formed police units			Total Police		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Samoa			–			–			–			–
Senegal	521	2	523	4	2	6	278	2	280	282	4	286
Serbia			–			–			–			–
Sierra Leone	4		4			–			–			–
Singapore			–			–			–			–
Slovakia			–			–			–			–
Slovenia			–			–			–			–
South Africa			–			–			–			–
Spain			–			–			–			–
Sri Lanka			–			–			–			–
Sweden	25	1	26	2	1	3			–	2	1	3
Switzerland	1		1		1	1			–		1	1
Tajikistan	–		–			–			–			–
Thailand			–			–			–			–
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia			–			–			–			–
Timor-Leste			–			–			–			–
Togo	913	16	929	4		4	140		140	144		144
Tunisia			–	1		1			–	1		1
Turkey			–	6		6			–	6		6
Uganda			–			–			–			–
Ukraine			–			–			–			–
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	2		2			–			–			–
United Republic of Tanzania			–			–			–			–
United States of America	9	1	10			–			–			–
Uruguay			–			–			–			–
Vanuatu			–			–			–			–
Yemen	4		4	5		5			–	5		5
Zambia			–			–			–			–
Zimbabwe			–			–			–			–
Totals	**8 222**	**102**	**8 324**	**123**	**12**	**135**	**800**	**39**	**839**	**923**	**51**	**974**